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Religion and Realpolitik: Reflections on Sacrifice
Carolyn Marvin
Annenberg School for Communication
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Enduring groups that seek to preserve themselves, as sacred communities do, face a structural
contradiction between the interests of individual group members and the survival interests of the group. In
addressing existential threats, sacred communities rely on a spectrum of coercive and violent actions that
resolve this contradiction in favor of solidarity. Despite different histories, this article argues, nationalism
and religiosity are most powerfully organized as sacred communities in which sacred violence is extracted
as sacrifice from community members. The exception is enduring groups that are able to rely on the
protection of other violence practicing groups. The argument rejects functionalist claims that sacrifice
guarantees solidarity or survival, since sacrificing groups regularly fail. In a rereading of Durkheim’s
totem taboo, it is argued that sacred communities cannot survive a permanent loss of sacrificial assent on
the part of members. Producing this assent is the work of ritual socialization. The deployment of
sacrificial violence on behalf of group survival, though deeply sobering, is best constrained by
recognizing how violence holds sacred communities in thrall rather than by denying the links between
them.
Keywords: sacred community, religious violence, sacrifice, totem, solidarity

At Dartmouth College, the site of this conference on religious violence,
twenty-four murals in the Baker Library depict the Mexican muralist José Orozco’s
rendering of the saga of American civilization. Near the beginning of the series, a
panel called “Ancient Human Sacrifice” portrays the Aztec ceremony of slicing the
heart from a live ritual victim. The victim’s limbs, arranged in a perfect X centered
on his soon to be excised organ, recall with a shock of recognition, the first page of
the Mendoza Codex, a compendium of Aztec history produced twenty years after
the Conquest by indigenous scribes. The same page conveys the founding legend
of the Aztec capital city Tehnochtitlan. It images two waterways rendered in the
shape of a St. Andrew’s cross converging on an eagle perched on a blooming
cactus sprung from a rock.
By legend the god Huitzilopochtli led the Mexica to a marshy islet in Lake
Texcoco where the ripped out heart of his murdered rival had taken root in a
flowering prickly pear on which a giant eagle rested. This, the Mexica were
instructed, was the site of Tenochtitlan. Scholars say the eagle signifies
Huitzilopochtli’s hunger for the human hearts that fuel his daily journey across the
firmament. The mortal heart of his rival, in turn, is the founding sacrifice of the
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city where human hearts were surrendered to the god. Thus does Orozco analogize
violent sacrifice to the iconic symbol (an eagle-cactus-rock glyph plus a serpent
signifying the man-god Quetzalcoatl) of modern Mexico.
Toward the end of the series, another panel “Modern Sacrifice” depicts an
elaborate flag-draped bier flanked with memorial wreaths bearing another
sacrificial victim, this time to nationalist dreams. In these panels Orozco links an
ancient religious rite to the modern religion of nationalism. His epic of America is
a theme of continuous sacrifice, the ritual axis around which the founding, memory
and renewal of a people revolves 1 . Orozco’s evocation of group sacrifice as a
historical constant visually mirrors my own understanding of how religion and
sacrifice are related, and how religious violence is related to national sacrifice in
particular.
This perspective contrasts with those of several conference participants who
question whether, in the first place, the term religion comprises any compelling
empirical referents for analysis. To those who doubt it, religious violence as a
subcategory of religion is so confounded with other sources of human motivation
as to be a nearly meaningless analytical term. A different and somewhat
contradictory perspective argues that religious violence by definition perverts the
true nature of religion and, when it seems to occur, proceeds from something
besides religion itself. Though these viewpoints are contradictory to one another,
both serve a deeply felt and widespread belief that violence can never be a genuine
attribute of religion.
Both positions belong, at least by tendency, to the book that is the occasion
for this conference, William Cavanaugh’s The Myth of Religious Violence 2 .
Cavanaugh suggests that Western nationalism has projected its own violent visage
on the face of religious history. Insofar as Cavanaugh means to argue that religion
is not easily distinguished from secular life, I agree, having myself argued for their
overlap in my book Blood Sacrifice and the Nation, 3 from which Cavanaugh
quotes. My inference from this fact departs from Cavanaugh’s, however (though I
would argue he never explicitly disagrees with the position I articulate in Blood
Sacrifice), and from the position of political theorists such as Ernest Gellner for
whom modernity is defined by the triumph of the secular over the religious.

1

Quetzalcoatl, bringer of a Golden Age to the Aztecs, is depicted as an exception who banishes sacrifice, but he is
also tragically banished and the Golden Age lost.
2
The Myth of Religious Violence
3
With David Ingle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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I propose that prevailing notions of religious phenomena are not too wide,
but too narrow, especially where nationalism is concerned. They fail to recognize
that so-called secular modern states are religious down to the bone, though both
leaders and citizens often deny it even as they organize the killing energies that
define them.4
Defining Religion
That some aspects of the binary divide between secular and religious
practice have been strained to the point of collapse seems a consensus position
among all conference participants, myself included. What is very much at issue are
its implications. A collapse of the binary might acknowledge the absence of a fixed
line between the religious and the secular, expanding backwards the range of what
can be considered secular, and forward, the range of what is considered religious.
But the impulse to disqualify religion altogether as a category of analysis suggests
that a deeper purpose of the religious-secular binary itself was always to insulate
religion, considered by some to be a category of the divine and by others the
accumulated moral wisdom of tradition, from possessing morally questionable,
which is to say violent, social impulses. In a political environment in which
differences among some contemporary persons of faith have become categories of
political condemnation, removing religion as a valid category for analysis makes it
possible to avoid uncomfortable questions about the broader relationship of
violence to religious phenomena more generally.
My sense of the inadequacy of the religious-secular binary strains in a
different direction, however. As I see it, questioning the binary helps us recognize
the fundamentally religious structuration of the nation-state. The sacrificial politics
of the modern nation-state, on which co-nationals stake the lives of their children,
their friends, and themselves, may suggest (and I will argue) that the problem of
violence is not that it is a feature of religion as such, but that it is a fundamental
processes of enduring groups generally, of which religious groups are exemplary
cases.
That the term religion has emerged relatively recently to describe human
activity is thought by some to disqualify what it refers to as a universal
phenomenon of human societies generally. If new historical circumstances have
forced to the surface a consciousness of religion as a phenomenon that may be
4

Ibid., pp. 1, 205. See also pp. 313-315.
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compared with other forms of life, this does not disqualify it as a descriptor of
certain long-standing features of group practice. The discursive novelty of religion,
relatively speaking, draws our interest to the timing and causes of its emergence as
a focus of self-reflection. This is not to claim that religion is a natural social kind,
but to acknowledge our need for vocabulary and concepts for social processes and
systems that, though variable and instantiated in a variety of contexts, share a
family resemblance, in this case with long-standing experiences of group
preservation manifest in elaborated practices of communal devotion.
In this paper I will use religion both loosely and contradictorily in order to
acknowledge the confessional lens through which most contemporary Americans
think about it, and in a specific analytic sense as (1) a field characterized by
communities of believers (2) that form around and cultivate the self-sacrifice of
members at various intensities of mutual commitment up to and including death
(which may be social as well as physical) (3) to achieve the goal specified in the
group's origin myth, which includes group survival. In this definition I mean to
encompass that which bounded groups take to be so undeniably true that they will
kill and sacrifice in its name to demonstrate and secure the preservation of notions
that so fundamentally define them. I treat religious and enduring as sociologically
synonymous, since religious devotion is what is characteristic of enduring groups.
In this view, the emergence of Western nationalism is a recognizably religious
response—characterized by new modes of belief and practice—to a constellation
of modernizing developments that historically challenged the great axial religious
traditions that organized generations of pre-modern populations.
I define modernity in the Gellnerian sense as the (uneven) growth of
economic specialization and interdependency based on new technologies of
transport, material production, and communication from the sixteenth century
forward that reset the conditions of group life on a scale that transformed
traditional social relationships. My definition of religion focuses on how enduring
groups persuade their members to sacrifice for the common good. My definition
does not focus on the content or presumed moral worth of religious doctrines. Such
accounts of how rather than that groups elicit sacrificial devotion are missing in
most analyses of nationalism (and pre-modern histories as well, but see Inga
Clendinnen’s interpretation of Aztec culture5).
Such an approach may be seen as functionalist, which for some will raise a
theoretical flag. In my view, conventional critiques of functionalism misconstrue
5

Inga Clendinnen, The Aztecs: An Interpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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the Durkheimian formula in which religion renews the collective representations of
the tribe and affirms its common sentiments. 6 A familiar criticism takes this to
mean that mere ritual performance has the capacity to create solidarity. 7 But
nothing in the Durkheimian oeuvre suggests that ritual performance never fails in
its effectivity. While some neo-Durkheimians have indeed presumed an automatic
effect for ritual performance,8 others such as Clifford Geertz9 and Bruce Kapferer
have acknowledged and examined ritual failures in depth. My own work examines
the conditions in which rituals of American nationalism fail and succeed. An
available analogy is that groups conduct war in order to win, but not all wars are
won by those who conduct them. Scholars have long acknowledged that ritual
functions extend beyond group solidarity and include, among other things, displays
of power, status transformation, and transmitting group memory. Nor has neoDurkheimian theory itself been invariably functionalist. Roy Rappaport has
powerfully shifted the conversation from solidarity to the commissives, or public
promises, to which ritual performatives contingently give rise. 10 This work is
highly suggestive for considering the relationship between religion and violence.
Finally, let me wrestle with the most obvious objection to the definition of
religion I have proposed. It seems to disqualify ordinary religious practice and
devotion, especially in the West, to the extent that these fall short of something like
willing martyrdom. What it does capture is what Scott Appleby calls "militant"
religion in his taxonomic categorization of the varieties of religious experience and
devotion. Appleby's taxonomy addresses the range of self-descriptive claims on
offer by those who count themselves believers. I am happy to acknowledge that the
nationalist strain of religion I examine here falls under the category of "militant."
Nonetheless, I argue that all religious doctrines consider, however indirectly,
foundational concerns of life and death within a collective framework of
devotional practice. This allows me to explore devotional practices that place life
and death problems front and center, unvarnished and undiluted. These are the
practices lie at the core of the relationship between devotion and violence.
Religion and Violence
6

Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life 1913 a unified set of beliefs and practices relative to
sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden, - beliefs and practices which unite [into] one single
moral community, all those who adhere to them (Durkheim [1915] 1964: 37 cited in Morris 1987).
7
Steven Lukes, “Political Ritual and Social Integration” Sociology 1975 ( 9), 289-308.
8
The classic case is Edward Shils and Michael Young, ”The Meaning of the Coronation,” Sociological Review NS (1)
1953, pp. 63-82.
9
Clifford Geertz, “Ritual and Social Change: A Javanese Example,” American Anthropologist 59 (1957), pp. 32-54.
10
Roy Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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Though deplored as a failure of diplomacy and morals, violence is a well
established strategy of enduring groups that compete for dominance 11 . E. O.
Wilson, David Sloan Wilson and others have recently proposed that group
competition is at least as powerful as gene competition as a selection (for E. O.
Wilson the major selection) factor in evolution,12 For political theorist Carl Schmitt
group competition is culturally manifest in the fierce division between friends and
enemies. Following Leibniz, Schmitt describes the rhetoric of the modern nationstate as “political theology”,13 acknowledging that “in case of need, the political
entity must demand the sacrifice of life.”14 Regrettably, Schmitt does not elaborate
how groups manage to persuade individuals to sacrifice flesh and blood for group
goals. Nor has E.O. Wilson done this. The closest Durkheim came was describing
the “collective effervescence” of tribalism, also without accounting for its
dynamics.15)
Building on Roy Rappaport’s analysis of how social commissives are
established by ritual, 16 I propose that ritual resolves the ethical contradiction that
pits long term group interests against the immediate survival of individuals.
Pursuing their own preservation, competing groups formulate a program of
protective force manifest in the willing submission of group members to an ethic of
sacrifice. 17 Three sorts of violence, 18 roughly speaking, characterize rituals of
group competition. These are: (1) the use of force against internal enemies to
protect group interests (2) the use of force against external enemies on behalf of
group interests (3) voluntary self-sacrifice by group members on behalf of group
interests. All qualify as cooperative and altruistic behaviors in the service of a
“parochial altruism”19 primed to incite hostility toward outgroups.
11

Enduring groups are multigenerational groups committed to what E.O. Wilson has called “defense of the nest”,
here understood as a definable territory, a population defined by a mission, or both, accompanied by organized
specialization of labor to meet the material and social needs of group members. This is a modified version of
criteria Wilson adduces to define tribes in The Social Conquest of Earth (2012).
12
See Edward O. Wilson, The Social Conquest of Earth (Liveright, 2012) and David Sloan Wilson, Darwin's Cathedral
13
Carl Schmitt, Political Theology : Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, (1934; Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1985), trans. George Schwab, p. 37.
14
Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, expanded edition, trans. by George Schwab (1932; Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 71.
15
He gives considerable attention to the totem taboo about which members of the clan agree not to disagree
without ever exploring the content of that agreement, which I argue is group willingness to sacrifice group
members. Marvin and Ingle, pp. FIND THIS
16
Roy A. Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999),
pp. 26-30, 391-396.
17
The umbrella of group protection may extend beyond the immediate group to allies on whose behalf the
primary group acts—e.g., the dependence of NATO or Canada on the dominant military power of the U.S.
18
Defined as the amount of force necessary to compel someone to do something against their will
19
Jung-Kyoo Choi and Samuel Bowles, “The Coevolution of Parochial Altruism and War,” Science, vol. 318, Oct. 26,
2007, pp. 636-640
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The business of a successful tribe is to engineer this coercion and extract
these sacrifices with the aim of cultivating a reserve of obligation that can be
tapped in the face of perceived existential threats (the accuracy of the perception is
not at issue, only the perception itself). A strategy that creates either internal or
external scapegoats—enemies—to assuage intolerable group anxiety may come at
devastating cost to those who execute it or are its targets. 20 This cost is always
measured against and justified by the specter of collective disintegration. Even if
group strengthening is sacrifice’s animating motive, not all sacrifice succeeds.
What makes a given sacrifice legitimate and potentially unifying to group members
is the conviction that it is voluntary and fairly shared out. Pains are taken to
conceal, minimize and justify sacrificial elements that fall short of these standards
of devotion, but such adjustments may reduce and even eliminate their power to
unify.

Religious Mobilization of Group Assent
I have argued that the resolution of conflicting group and individual interests
is achieved in the religious mobilization of group assent. Recall once more my
definition of religion as a ritual vehicle that links bodies to gestures and discourses
that instantiate social obligation. To effect the survival task established in a group
origin myth, rituals cultivate the committed self-sacrifice of members at different
20

Vivid examples of scapegoating include the disproportionate incarceration and execution of black males in the
20
United States since Reconstruction from lynching and Jim Crow to state-sponsored capital punishment. A more
visibly religious case is the shielding by certain ultra-Orthodox communities in New York City of ultra-Orthodox
child molesters by coercing the silence of some victims and their families so as to avoid the fracture of group
integrity on the part of secular authorities:
Some ultra-Orthodox Jews want to keep abuse allegations quiet to protect the reputation of the
community…And rabbinical authorities, eager to maintain control, worry that inviting outside scrutiny
could erode their power, said Samuel Heilman, a professor of Jewish studies at Queens College.
“They are more afraid of the outside world than the deviants within their own community,” Dr.
[Samuel} Heilman [a professor of Jewish studies at Queens College] said. “The deviants threaten
individuals here or there, but the outside world threatens everyone and the entire structure of their
world.” Sharon Otterson and Ray Rivera, “Ultra-Orthodox Shun Their Own for Reporting Child Abuse,”
New York Times, May 19, 2012.
Procrastinations and denials in the Catholic priest pedophilia scandal reflect a similar group-protective reflex by
church officials. However, the church is subject to the jurisdiction of political authority, the relevant community
with enduring group responsibilities. The sacrifice of children in the interest of survival is common in group
sacrifice. More easily seen as legitimate than intra-group sacrifice by Catholics and Hasidim is the broad based
sacrifice of soldiers—but only in popular wars (wars to which, by definition, such sacrifice is broadly consented to)!
Poignantly, soldiers are typically young and always the children of citizens.
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levels of devotion up to and including death. Death is not the only worthy
devotional practice, but religious commitment is often measured by the willingness
of individuals to die for the myth. It may be national or religious so long as it
establishes what is required for the survival of the group and its mission.
Granted, this omits those conventionally religious groups in the West for
which few members would willingly sacrifice their lives today. The history of
modern warfare suggests that, in the face of serious group threat, many of these
members will rapidly move to place themselves under the protection of a
nationalism that does ask some group members to sacrifice themselves. At any
historical moment, the worthiness of the request is a pressing and legitimate
debate. This makes the point that religion—confessional or national—is, for the
purposes of this argument, less a carrier of noble doctrines than a strategy of
mobilization for group preservation. That strategy is very much served by noble
doctrines of cooperation in combination with prescribed gestures of ritual devotion.
This is not a cynical observation. Notions of goodness are regularly anchored in
group ideals of cooperation, consensus and sacrifice. Their power is captured in
Clifford Geertz’s well known dictum that religion acts to “…(2) establish
powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3)
formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these
conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations
seem uniquely realistic.” 21 In this context, virtue is amically determined. (An
analytic disposition to resist universal notions of religion may be contrasted with
its logical obverse—the less controversial disposition to invoke trans-group ethical
standards condemning violence wherever it is found.)
Why do I insist that violence (and its paler shadow, non-violent group
coercion), a social action many contemporary faiths reject unequivocally, is
religiously foundational? Because humans want to believe that the lives of group
members can be sacrificed, whether willingly or by coercion, for an ultimate truth
only. It is no great step from this to the belief, commonly articulated in religious
rhetoric, that what we are willing to sacrifice our bodies for must, therefore, be the
truth. Sectarian religion and nationalism are parallel communities of faith since the
true object of worship in each case is the entity to whom legitimate authority to kill
is morally assigned. By this reasoning, nationalism may be understood as the
ascendant faith of our historical moment. Some who are reluctant to acknowledge
the killing authority of so-called secular powers are willing to invest God with the
21

Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion. M. Banton,
ed., (London: Tavistock XLII, 1985), p. 176.
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right to “take” souls, as the saying goes. The foundation of the Christian message
is, of course, a son willing to die for the eternal preservation of the father’s other
children. Even believers often make practical peace with the killing authority of the
nation-state in principle, while particular circumstances for properly exercising it
remain up for debate. There are also national communities in which killing
authority is seamlessly shared between God and a nation that is said to act on God's
behalf. Those who fear the fervor of confessionally mandated killing and selfsacrifice may sometimes fail to recognize the ways that similar mythic mechanisms
authorize self-sacrifice within their own national groups.
Among the attributes shared by national and confessional groups we may
count the following22:
1. Origin myths that situate believers in the cosmos and offer consolation for
the most wrenching human tragedies, especially mortality.
2. Primary social bonds expressed in ritual obligations that connect
community members to one another and to an origin myth of a transcendental
group purpose.
3. Explicit forms of participation that establish grounds for group
membership.
4. Doctrines of correct belief and commandments of duty and devotion
including self-sacrifice.
That enduring groups are authorized to command and take human life,
effort, and treasure when group survival requires it, are what Schmitt and
Agamben 23 call the state of exception. This does not mean killing authority
exercises its power absent criticism or objection from believers. It means that
sovereign authority is vested only in that entity that undertakes to guarantee group
survival, in this case, the nation or group deity. While treating violence as a failure
of moral imagination, liberal philosophy fails to address how enduring groups can
persist absent the option to act with force against existential threats. Even those
who believe violence is always morally wrong rarely condemn non-violent selfsacrifice. Since non-violence often turns out to be most potent when it provokes a
violent response from antagonists, those who deploy non-violence logically share
responsibility for whatever violent response it may inspire.

22
23

Adapted from Blood Sacrifice and the Nation, p. 16.
Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, 1998).
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Examining the historiography of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
Cavanaugh argues that instead of being the solution to religious wars, the liberal
state actively instigated or was complicit in wars mislabeled as religiously
motivated. As he sees it, the self-deceiving conclusion that the liberal nation-state
is the solution to religious violence is enshrined in the triumphalist creation myth
of modern Western societies, and this myth has long been used to justify Western
military intervention, most recently in the Middle East.
When we do try to justify violence, we often cast it, reluctantly, as a political
necessity in a fallen world or as a failure of diplomacy and morals, rather than
theorizing it as a strategy of persisting social groups asserting their interests in
order to survive and prosper over long periods, as national and religious groups do.
(Such groups are characterized as eusocial by the evolutionary biologist E. O.
Wilson The Social Conquest of the Earth (Liveright, 2012). They are
multigenerational, characterized by defense of the nest, and the specialization of
reproductive and defensive labor.)
It may be more helpful to regard violence as a shocking but unavoidable
feature of the social cooperation that is necessary for group survival. Abstractly
defined, cooperation is a strategy of working consensually toward common ends.
Our most optimistic notions of cooperation envision approximately equal efforts
by willing collaborators. This is a quality of much cooperation, and fine as far as it
goes. But some forms of cooperation involve very unequal contributions of time,
talent, and treasure among collaborators, up to and including the death or
impairment of some members of the group to serve its larger good. Through this
lens, violence experienced within the group or perpetrated on outsiders is the
dramatic, physically coercive assertion of the perceived survival interests of a
group or tribe against whoever resists those interests, including reluctant members
within the group. Cooperation—a collective undertaking for the ultimate purpose
of enduring generationally—requires significant sacrifice, variously voluntary and
compelled, and sometimes violently enacted.
The negotiation of that sacrifice is always political. This is because sacrifice
is often not in the immediate interest of those doing the sacrificing (hewing to a
fundamental definition of sacrifice as the maintenance of the conditions of group
existence by a propitiatory offering that requires alienating something of value to
the sacrificer), however much it may be in the long term interest of the group. The
business of a successful group is nonetheless to extract these sacrifices by creating
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strong and weak ties that provide conditions for daily flourishing and a reserve of
collective commitment to draw on when existential threats loom. 24
The discussion suggests a sinister dimension to collective survival within
groups, never mind outside them. Some sacrifices may indeed come at devastating
expense to some group members, as when scapegoats are feverishly sacrificed to
assuage intolerable group anxiety. (Some would count the disproportionate
incarceration and execution of African-American men in the United States since
Reconstruction in this category, whether by lynching or capital punishment.) When
violent coercion is internally exercised for sacrificial ends, pains are taken to
conceal, minimize and justify it (rarely in self-consciously conspiratorial terms
given broad collective support for denying the ethical quandary of sacrificing
members the group exists to protect in the interest of group harmony and survival).
That individuals cannot survive at all outside group protection sets up an inevitable
ethical conflict between individual and group interests that will, in the end, be
resolved in the perceived interest of the group if the latter is to flourish.
In pursuit of generational viability, group rhetoric treats all cooperation as a
win-win at both individual and tribal levels regardless of how sacrificial effort is
distributed. Such rhetoric is not framed as an emotionally and morally deflated
cost benefit-analysis with respect to that distribution, though such considerations
are present. Those who embody group moral and political authority proffer a tribal
notion of the group as embodying a purpose larger than any single member. In the
name of this purpose, cultivated and reinforced in ritual (focusing shared attention,
establishing obligation to a group goal and presuming shared sentiment)25 (Wilson
(2012), p. 228), willing sacrifice is elicited from those who must be persuaded,
converted or, if absolutely necessary, intimidated and coerced—whatever it takes.
The more visible the level of coercion, however, the more shared sentiment about
goals is brought into question, and the less effective the exercise in the service of
group bonding. For this reason much energy goes into rehearsing and socializing
the foundational myths and logics of group persistence from early in the lives of
group members. This continuing cultivation in members of an obligation to the
group is a religious exercise at its core, buttressed by demonstrably religious
24

It is not necessary for everyone to believe all the time in this metaphysical sovereignty of the national group,
anymore than it is necessary for everyone to believe all the time in the metaphysical divinity of the religious group.
All that is important is that when the crisis comes, that religious and citizen believers are willing to make the
necessary effort on behalf of the group to keep it alive. If they are not willing, the religion or nation will die. Even if
such efforts do not issue in immediate worldly victory, though it is of course better if they do, the group will not
necessarily cease to be. Enduring groups who keep the faith alive can last a long time as fellowships of believers
bereft of homeland or the granted privilege to worship. What kills nations and religions is when their believers
simply become indifferent or desert the cause.
25
Wilson, The Social Conquest of Earth, p. 228.
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language and symbolism. Patriots and religious believers are, in this light, different
blooms on the same tree of group flourishing.
National and confessional groups alike embody transcendental, sacred
purposes narrativized in creation myths discursively rehearsed, ritually performed,
updated to encompass unfolding events, and interpreted to instantiate a mythical
history in which founding heroes are the originators, and contemporary figurers the
bearers of group values and purposes. What Cavanaugh calls the creation myth of
national groups is the collapse of real and invented history into an account of why
a given group embodies a righteous claim to killing authority compared to groups
that preceded them and competitors they face in the struggle for dominance.
Though modern human beings belong to multiple groups that redound to
their benefit, survival requires some level of membership in at least one primary
group that takes responsibility for defending the (territorial) group nest and its
members. Technological advances in communication and transportation have
enabled primary groups once limited to bands of hunter-gatherers to manifest as
large-scale primary groups sheltering smaller groups that consent to the primary
group’s Weberian monopoly on violence (or alliance with those who exercise this
monopoly, as Europe in the case of NATO submits to the U.S.). Larger group size
increases the possibilities for functional specialization among members, so that a
smaller percentage of citizens have to be concerned with defending borders and the
rest can get on with other aspects of the collective business of group flourishing.
In the contemporary world, such groups are usually nations, and their
instruments are armies and police forces. In stable nations group members, or
citizens, submit themselves to governance that rests on such killing authority. If
some primary groups are large enough to shift the burden of policing group threats
from most of their members, the tradeoff is that violence occurs on a far more
destructive scale when it does happen. While liberal philosophy treats violence as a
failure of morality and imagination that, remedied, would produce peace, it does
not address how to organize generationally persisting primary groups absent a
capacity to assert their existential interests with force internally and externally.
If religion is no stranger to violence, it shares this characteristic with
nationalism, the distinctive group faith of modernity. Although Cavanaugh rightly
questions the stereotype of confessional groups as the principal global perpetrators
of violence, primary enduring groups that are confessional do sometimes organize
and mobilize killing energies as a measure of their devotional commitment.
Multigenerational groups have quite likely organized such energies at some time in
their histories, or else accepted protection from groups that do. As Cavanaugh’s
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useful survey of the historiography of the so-called religious wars of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries shows, national and confessional grievances are easily
conflated. This is not because religion poorly describes human devotional
practices, or because national and faith traditions are structurally distinct on this
dimension. It is because national and faith traditions emerged as dominant social
formations at different historical moments. That national and faith traditions are
structurally similar is exactly why they so easily combine and compete with one
another.
I have argued that this reading allows us to frame the separation of church
and state in the United States as a long-time barrier to confessional appropriations
of the sacrificial authority that underlies nation-state authority and power. A wall
of separation authorizes citizens under the protection of the nation-state to believe
anything they wish in return for their consent not to kill in the name of what they
believe, nor to compel the sacrifice of believers or of non-believers to confessional
ends. Any violation will cause the state to intervene and jealously assert its own
sacrificial authority as it did in 1993 in the case of David Koresh and his followers
in Waco, and against nineteenth-century Mormons who also attempted to usurp
nation-state killing authority, the so-called state of exception.
Church-state separation is not the only pattern, of course. A second is statesponsored churches (the pattern of the United Kingdom, Denmark and Thailand
among others). State-sponsored churches embrace the principle of national killing
authority and are thereby defanged. This is equivalent in effect to the U.S. pattern.
Still another pattern is Lebanon, which distributes top state offices among
competing religious factions. A fourth pattern is that a religious entity morally
authorizes state power and may assist in exercising it, as in the Islamic Republic of
Iran. Somewhat similar is the Jewish state of Israel, where the state claims legal
primacy but where the advice of faith is energetically acknowledged, courted (by
some administrations more than others), and called upon to justify national ends,
indeed, conflated with them on occasion.
American Exceptionalism
We are back to the mechanics of enduring groups. Where state and
individual interests structurally conflict, how can individuals be convinced to
sacrifice themselves for the cause?
Durkheim metaphorized the powerful mechanisms of cooperation that
persisting groups require in the concept of the totem. He frankly acknowledged
that the constant production of friction within families, political clans, cities, and
nations require powerful ritual mechanisms to periodically restore a sense of
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collective commitment. He did not examine violence as a necessary instrument of
group solidarity and a threat to it. He spoke of the totem taboo, the symbolic
embodiment of altruistic cooperation, about which, as a sign of devotion, members
agree not to disagree. As it relates to violence, the totem taboo may be reconceived
as the tacit but impossible-to-acknowledge agreement that group members must be
sacrificed for the group to survive. This mobilization directs the killing energies of
nations and religious groups away from and toward a larger external threat. It is
this transformation of disruptive killing energy into group devotion instantiated in
sacrifice that channels aggression away from the group and toward group enemies.
To mobilize believers, origin myths charter and authorize the tribe (religious
or national) as the most righteous of groups. In the United States, this idea is
contained in the myth of American exceptionalism and justified by a sacred history
of conquest in the name of freedom. Doctrinally, persons are made fully human by
the freedom (a spiritual quality in this vocabulary) they are permitted to exercise.
Advancing freedom is a mission that gives meaning and cosmological purpose to
lives sacrificed on behalf of the group. These meanings are elaborated in sacred
symbols and rituals that are easily recognized as religious in character and tone. In
the United States, the flag is the most emotionally potent totem of group identity
and ritual activity. It is endowed with sacred liveness, and rhetorically and
mythically cast as an agent that gathers the martyred fallen to itself. The archetypal
extension of the origin myth tells of soldiers who exchange their own lives to
preserve the flag and, by this means, the tribe it embodies.
Among eusocial groups generally and nation-states in particular, devotion to
an all-powerful group idea can stimulate an altruistic shared commitment among
group members that trumps the calculus of individual self interest and creates a
moral obligation to serve the group imperative—whether for those who sacrifice
themselves or those who love and offer them without complaint. 26 From this
perspective, nationalism can be rightly understood as the characteristic religion of
modernity, doctrinally and emotionally suited to modern believers for whom the
great traditional religions of axial age invention no longer command levels of selfsacrificing devotion.
Be that as it may, devoted nationalists often insist that patriotism is secular
and not like religion at all. But this makes sense. Countenancing overt equivalence
between patriotism and religion would render confessional faith entitled,
26
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theoretically at least, to exercise the privilege of killing authority. This challenges
the self-described right of the nation-state to elevate its own killing power above
that of religion which, in its own origin myth, it succeeds and replaces. By denying
the religious character of patriotic devotion, contrary to its rhetoric and ritual form,
the nation cements its monopoly on the command of sacrificial violence and keeps
sectarian competitors for the loyalty of citizens at bay.
Can enduring groups fail? When the contemporary adaptations of an origin
myth are no longer compelling to followers, belief in its protective powers and in
the sacrificial obligation it enshrines will be at risk. Sooner or later, the group must
disband, or be absorbed by, or seek the protection of, those with more urgent and
convincing myths. While a more or less unified ideology is no guarantee of group
dominance, willingness to compete cannot long be sustained in its absence. Not
every member of the group need agree with every other about every point, or even
with majority opinion. What is needed at times of collective threat is that everyone
knows the obligations of tribal commitment and can persuade themselves of the
necessity of group response.
This does not mean that dissent is meaningless, especially when a group is
set to launch some calamity to its prospects for survival, or violate human rights
that are felt to morally constrain both our own and other group members. Nor does
it mean that dissent is never successful. But we engage with extraordinarily
powerful group sentiments whenever nations contemplate sacrificing the flower of
their youth, or Abraham gets ready to murder Isaac, when citizens protest
repressive governments in the Arab spring, the Cultural Revolution roots out the
wavering and even, on a milder level, when universities deny tenure to nonperforming assistant professors in their competition for academic prestige,
acquisition of resources, and the recruitment of new and talented members.
Though social death is not physical death, it remains a powerful expression of
group dynamics and may be traumatic or life transforming in its way.
Nor can the moral dilemmas of sacrifice be wished away by relying on the
wisdom and benevolence of democratic regimes. In the competition for
dominance, force is a resource for all enduring groups, including democratic ones.
Amartya Sen and his followers have argued that democratic groups are better able
to debate what counts as a threat and the level of volition or coercion to be
exercised in response because they are morally and procedurally bound to seek the
expressed approval of majorities. 27 Democratic regimes may sometimes be able to
debate more fully what counts as a threat, who threatens, and the level of sacrifice
27
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to be exercised in response to threat. But the structural incommensurability of
individual and group interests (never mind the welfare of non-believing others,
those propagandized useful enemies) haunts all ideological colorings and every
claim of democracy to liberate individuals.
To conclude: confessionalism and patriotism are different ways of binding
multigenerational enduring groups. Both must answer to the moral paradox of
group survival in which some members are sacrificed to save others. This is the
fundamental moral challenge of group life. Are human groups doomed, therefore,
to violently compete? The profane world will, of course, always be ours to live in.
If past times were saturated with religiopolitical dilemmas, present times are no
less fraught. Though it is futile to imagine that violence can entirely disappear
from human affairs, our understanding of how it holds us in thrall may make us
more humble in managing it. In that hope is meaning itself and, in the various ways
we construe it, religion as we practice it in the world.
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